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Abstract - Neuroscientific research has not only proved to be vital in our increasing
understanding of human nature, but has also led to much normative discourse
revolving around morality and law. There has been much work done regarding how
neuroscience should inform us on issues regarding moral responsibility. In this paper,
I propose to employ a Kantian moral framework to consider these issues more
carefully. I argue that generally, neuroscience cannot undermine the concept that
rational beings are morally responsible for their actions. However, within the same
Kantian moral philosophical framework, I will consider how it is that certain
individuals can be excused for their actions or have their responsibility mitigated.
This will be done by focusing on the interaction between neuroscientific evidence and
the capacity of certain individuals to engage with categorical and hypothetical
imperatives. I will consider how it is that neuroscientific evidence can serve as an a
priori excusing condition for moral responsibility, and equally importantly, when it
cannot. I then go on to explore how our understanding of the workings of the brain
can improve legal doctrine. I suggest that neuroscience can help to demonstrate that
certain psychological criteria underlying particular legal doctrine might be inaccurate,
and to improve our sentencing policies in order to better fulfil both retributive and
rehabilitative aims and the criminal law.
A. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of neuroscientific research has led to the
suggestion that our growing knowledge of how the brain works will
revolutionise our idea of moral and legal responsibility.' This essay seeks
to achieve two aims. The first aim, which is the main focus of the essay,
would be to employ Kantian moral philosophy in addressing how
* I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Michael Freeman and Professor
Stephen Guest for their mentorship, guidance and inspiration in writing this paper.
Thanks also go to Associate Professor Yap Po Jen for his helpful comments. The
usual caveat applies.
S. Morse, 'Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience' in M. Freeman
(ed), Law and Neuroscience (Oxford University Press 2011) 529.
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neuroscience should inform us on issues regarding moral responsibility.
The second would be to explore how the law, in so far as it is informed
by morality, should take into account neuroscientific research. On a
preliminary note, I point out that moral responsibility is different from
legal responsibility. There are many reasons why we may rightly
sequester or even incarcerate people whom we believe to be dangerous to
others in society even though we do not think that they are morally
culpable for their actions. 2 Also, I adopt a Kantian moral framework,
because I believe that our ability to reason is what allows us to even
comprehend the idea of responsibility in the first place. Kantian moral
philosophy which is premised on the capacity of rational beings for pure
practical reason will prove to be a fruitful foundation on which to base
critical analysis of moral responsibility. For want of space, this essay will
not address the long standing debate involving the three main Western
classical moral theories of utilitarianism, deontology and virtue theory,
and their relation to neural mechanisms of moral cognition. 3
The first part of the essay outlines areas of Kantian moral
philosophy in order to allow us to understand what it means to be morally
responsible for one's actions. The second part of this essay addresses
neuroscientific challenges to the concept of responsibility itself. In the
third part of the essay, I explore how discoveries in neuroscience can help
us to decide when we should excuse or mitigate moral responsibility in
certain individuals. Lastly, I go on to discuss the ways in which
neuroscience can help to change and improve legal doctrines and
practices.
B. KANTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
I set out the moral philosophy of Kant by first establishing what Kant
means by having a good will. I then go on to discuss Kant's conception
of freedom, before stating what Kant means to act morally. Lastly, I
establish the concept of moral responsibility which will be used in this
essay.
2 N. Levy, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press
2007) 257.
3 W. D. Casebeer, 'Moral Cognition and Its Neural Constituents' in W. Glannon,
Defining Right and Wrong in Brain Science: Essential Readings in Neuroethics (Dana
Press 2007) 207.
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1. Kantian Concept of the Good Will
In Kant's view, common reason allows us to recognise many different
forms of good, such as wealth, power, talent and intellect, and even
goodness of kindly or generous dispositions. However, he also opines
that the only good which is unconditional is that of the good will. A good
will is also distinguished from a will that acts to achieve an ulterior end.
The will, if it is to be a good will, must act from duty.4 Some critics of
Kant have picked up on the fact that since good is not defined
substantially, there is no meaning to the good will. Kant's reply to this
was that good in this sense, was acting out of duty in reverence for the
moral law which obligates all free and rational beings.5
2. Kantian Conception of Freedom
Kant expresses the idea that as rational beings, our will is an ought, which
expresses a necessity for action as a law. We are interested in acting in a
particular way because we are motivated by our various desires for what
we hope to achieve.6 The ability to act from interest, free of internal and
external impediments such that we can do anything we choose to is what
Kant calls 'psychological freedom'.7 However, to base our understanding
of freedom on experience, describes only prudential, and not morally
worthy conduct. Kant then argues that freedom in the full moral sense is
to not allow ourselves to act from interest, but rather to take an immediate
interest in acting. We must be able to exercise our will without being
influenced to do so by any causes except our own reason, which include
our desires and inclinations. This conception of freedom is a
transcendental idea of reason, because it originates only in our own
reason without recourse to any possible sensory experience. This is what
Kant calls to possess the power of 'pure practical reason'. 9 This
conception of freedom can be defined both negatively and positively.
4 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), tr. M. J. Gregor
(Cambridge University Press 1997) 7/393.
5 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), tr. L. W Beck (Chicago, 1949) 74, 78,
117, 158; see also R. J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge
University Press 1989) 133-134.
6 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals (n 4), 35/427.
7 Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (n 5), 45.
8 Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason (n 5), 15-16.
9 ibid 22.
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The negative conception of freedom is our ability to 'restrain and
overcome inclinations by reasons' when we act.' 0  The positive
conception of freedom is the power of absolute causal self-determination,
enabling us to act autonomously based on nothing but our own
reasoning." Importantly, this Kantian conception of freedom means that
'a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same'.12
Therefore, to be free means to be a morally responsible person.13
3. Kantian Morality
Kant in analysing human agency begins with the proposition that all
practical rules always appear to us as commands or imperatives, because
as human beings we are only contingently rational. 14 Such imperatives
appear to us in two forms, categorical and hypothetical. Hypothetical
imperatives are based on our desires and inclinations, and command us to
act with ends in mind derived from interest. This imperative is
hypothetical, because it can cease to exist just by altering our inclinations
and desires. The categorical imperative speaks to us as a moral rule
which prevents us from acting immorally. This imperative is
unconditional, because morality is grounded in our own reason, and as
rational beings, we cannot choose to discard it like how we can do with
our desires.' 5 Therefore, in order of us to act morally, we must presume
the Categorical Imperative as our ultimate norm.16 This is made possible,
as Kant explains, because as rational beings in the world of nature, we see
the world from 'two standpoints'.' 7 When we imagine ourselves trying to
understand how we affect and are affected in the world of sense (the
'phenomenal world'), we have to regard ourselves as subject to the laws
of causal determination. Because we reason practically about how we
should act, we belong to the intelligible world (the 'noumenal world'),
10 I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals (1797), tr. M. J. Gregor (Cambridge University
Press 1996) 481.
" ibid, 213-14.
12 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals (n 4), 52/447.
13 Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (n 5), 46.
14 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals (n 4), 24-26/413-14.
15 ibid, 30/420.
16 Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (n 5), 50.
17 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals (n 4), 55/450.
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where we are free from all causal determination and are bound only by
the moral law as autonomous beings.' 8
In this essay, I will not explore exactly how Kant tells us the
Categorical Imperative commands us to act. I will simply state that the
Categorical Imperative is a purely formal criterion, which requires no
special methodology except for the capacity for pure practical reason.19
Therefore, all rational beings can know how the Categorical Imperative
commands, and of the obligations the moral law generates.20 The
problem this gives rise to is that we must be held culpable for erroneous
moral judgments about our obligations, and that there is an assumption
that these erroneous judgments must have been adopted in bad faith and
be due to bad moral character.21 This is a very pertinent question, since
as social creatures we all understand that there are varying capacities for
rationality, and hence, quality of objective judgment. Kant does
recognise that it is indeed possible that one might at times err 'in
objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not' and that the
principles a person of good character adopts 'might occasionally be
mistaken and imperfect' .22 However, I believe that this allows us to
understand that moral enlightenment is a journey which all rational
beings are gifted with the capacity to begin on. In fact, such a contention
is in light with our intuitions on moral responsibility, given that we deem
infants to be less morally responsible than adults, and we adjust this scale
of culpability as one grows in capacity to reason.
4. The Concept of Moral Responsibility
Kantian moral philosophy tells us that as long as we have the relevant
mental capacities to act freely, we should be held responsible for our
actions. As contingently rational beings, we do not necessarily have to
exercise our free will and practical reason in every instance to be morally
responsible. As long as we understand that morality commands us as a
law, and that action should be governed by reason, we must be morally
18 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals (n 4), 57/453.
19 Kant, Metaphysics ofMorals (n 10), 411.
20 I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (1780-85), tr. L. Infield (London: Methuen, 1930)
355/133.
21 ibid., 355/132-33.
22 Kant, Metaphysics ofMorals (n 10), 401.
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responsible when we fail to do so. Yet free will and reason is not an all-
or-nothing capacity. It is a capacity that comes in degrees along a
spectrum of control since we are beings in the world of sense. There are
two possible reasons that can exempt a being from the moral law. The
first reason is that to argue that the being is not a rational being and
cannot recognise the action-guiding nature of reasons. This in fact, is
what we employ to absolve moral blameworthiness with animals 23 and
some mentally disabled adults, who are impaired in their ability to reason.
Such an excuse, however, cannot be employed on ourselves, since a
person cannot consistently offer a reason for doing something and yet
claim to be incapable of rational thought. The second reason is to say that
a being through no fault of his or her own, could not affect his or her
actions through reason. Therefore, action is only determined by laws of
nature and one's inclinations.
C. NEUROSCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES TO THE CONCEPT OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Neuroscience has emerged as the latest mechanistic causal science that
appears to explain behaviour in a deterministic manner which challenges
the concept of free will, and therefore whether anyone can be morally
responsible. The issue is whether human beings have the capacity to act
uncaused by anything other than themselves, and whether this capacity
should be the criteria for holding anybody morally responsible for his or
her actions. However, neuroscience does not seem to add anything novel
to the metaphysical problem of free will.2 4 If the question of the validity
of free will can be answered, there will undoubtedly be profound
implications for doctrines of responsibility, and social concepts such as
blame and punishment. No resolution of this problem, however, seems to
be in sight.25 Notwithstanding this metaphysical problem, neuroscience
has challenged the concept of moral responsibility in two other ways.
The first is to question whether mental states have any causal effect in the
23 It is noted that there have been studies conducted by De Waal demonstrating that
animals might be able to engage in robust moral reasoning. See F. R. De Waal, Good
natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press 1996).
24 It simply joins the ranks of behaviourism, genetics, social structure variables etc.
25 Morse (n 1) 534.
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first place, and the second is to question the effect moral luck should have
on whether anyone should be held morally responsible. I address these
challenges using Kantian moral philosophy as an analytical tool.
1. Consciousness and Moral Responsibility
This challenge from neuroscience comes from an experiment
conducted in the 1980s by neuroscientist Benjamin Libet and his team,
which suggested that because we do not consciously cause our behaviour,
we are not free and therefore cannot be morally responsible. Libet
measured brain activity during voluntary hand movements, and
discovered that before we actually move our hand, there is a wave of
brain activity indicating when our brain knows we are aware of making
the decision to move, which he calls the 'readiness potential'. The timing
of the readiness potential was then compared with the conscious
movement of the hands of the subjects, and it was found that the moment
of conscious decision making was about 300 milliseconds later than the
onset of readiness potential. Assuming the veracity of the empirical data,
this finding would mean that consciousness is informed of the decision
but does not make it. Libet then puts forward the proposition that we
ought not to hold agents responsible for actions performed 'without the
possibility of conscious control'. Since consciousness comes after
decisions are already made, none of our actions are consciously
controlled and therefore we cannot be morally responsible for our actions.
There have been many criticisms of Libet's experiment which
argue that it does not bear upon the role of consciousness in decision-
making at all. Flanagan argues that we consciously initiate important
decisions, while leaving the details of the implementation of these
decisions to subpersonal processes, and this is consistent with Libet's
empirical data.26 Haggard has furthered this point by arguing that
although we might not consciously initiate our actions, our conscious
intention is what decides how precisely we act (for example, we
consciously decide whether to use our left or right hand during the
26 O. Flanagan, 'Neuroscience, agency, and the meaning of life' in 0. Flanagan, ed.,
Self-Expressions: Mind, Morals and the meaning of Life (New York: Oxford
University Press 1996a) 53-64.
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experiment).27 Dennett has also highlighted an important point that it
might be a mistake to employ the notion of a Cartesian Theatre in
28
understanding how anything enters into our consciousness. Having
such a notion of self, suggests that there is a precise moment at which
something enters our consciousness, but as affirmed by contemporary
philosophers and neuroscientists, consciousness is a 'process with fuzzy
edges'. 29
Notwithstanding the earlier criticisms made, I will argue by
adopting a Kantian moral philosophy, that even if we are not conscious of
our decision-making process, we should still be morally responsible for
our actions. Libet himself does not believe that his work shows that we
lack free will or moral responsibility. He suggests that although we do
not consciously initiate action, we possess the power consciously to veto
actions. 3 0  However, in analysing this proposition according to the
Kantian philosophy of the free will, I believe that this argument by Libet
proves too little. As proposed by Nozick, there seems to be two ways in
which we make decisions: we can weigh our reasons or we can weight
our reasons.31 Weighing our reasons allow us to incorporate our beliefs,
plans, values, desires and goals when working out what to do. Weighting
is when we assign certain reasons a weight arbitrarily. We then make our
decisions based on the fact that the weight we have attributed to doing
32
something makes that aim important. According to Kant, we should
weigh our reasons, as this is the process by which we engage with our
capacity for rational thought and give due reverence to the moral law.
Therefore, what matters in decision making is that we adopt a rational
weighing of our reasons to act as opposed to arbitrary weighting. This
will allow us to recognise that an active causal power to veto actions is
not what matters, since this power can be exercised by either weighing or
weighting of our reasons. Also, the claim that consciousness does not
27 P. Haggard and B. Libet, 'Conscious intention and brain activity', (2001) 8 Journal
of Consciousness Studies 47-63.
28 D. Dennett, Freedom Evolves (London: Allen Lane 2003).
29Levy, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century, 228.
30 B. Libet, 'Do We Have Free Will', in B. Libet, A. Freeman, K. Sutherland, eds.,
The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will (Imprint Academic 1999)
47.
31 R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford University Press 1981).
32 Levy (n 29) 235.
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learn of the agent's decisions until after they are made does not seem to
matter to the question of having moral responsibility for our actions. The
concept of free will is not contingent on the notion of uncaused choice,
but in decisions that are made rationally, knowingly and intentionally. As
long as our decisions are made rationally, and that we affect our actions
accordingly, precisely when consciousness learns of this decision does
not matter.
2. Moral Luck
One of the challenges to the concept of moral responsibility we must
address which arises out of neuroscience is the issue of moral luck.
Moral luck is the assertion that people are affected by constitutive,
antecedent and circumstantial conditions which then impacts on whether
their actions are moral or immoral.34 A research study by a team of
neuroscientists led by Caspi and Moffitt, tested the hypothesis that
'childhood maltreatment predisposes most strongly to adult violence
among children whose monoamine oxidase (MAOA) is insufficient to
constrain maltreatment-induced changes to the neurotransmitter system'.
The central findings of the study found that males with low-MAOA
activity who also suffered early childhood abuse are 9.8 times more likely
to be convicted of violent crimes than males who were born into any of
the other 3 permutations. These findings therefore underscore our
intuitions about moral responsibility, since it leaves no room for
considerations of a violent, abusive childhood and bad moral constitutive
luck.3 5 This study is nonetheless a descriptive one, and does not lead to
normative conclusions of when we should be morally responsible for our
actions. However, the study demonstrates how it is that moral luck might
affect our normative considerations of moral responsibility, and we have
to address this challenge to our intuitions in order to determine what we
ought to do.3 6
The question we seek to answer seems to be whether we should
ascribe moral responsibility to individuals whom we know suffer from
neuropsychological deficits for which they were unlucky to have in the
33 ibid. 237.
34 T. Y. Blumoff, 'How (some) Criminals Are Made', in M. Freeman (n 1) 171.
35 ibid 12.36 ibid 13.
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first place. 37 This brings out the point, that essentially, as moral agents in
the phenomenal world, there is a danger that our moral responsibilities
might outrun control we have over how things turn out.3 8 I believe,
however, that by utilising the Kantian framework in understanding the
concept of moral responsibility, we will be able to adequately resolve this
issue satisfactorily. By looking for the capacity for pure practical reason
in deciding whether an individual should be morally responsible for his or
her actions, we provide moral responsibility with 'a shelter against luck,
as one realm of value that is defended against contingency'. 39 Therefore,
unless it can be shown that children with low-MAOA activity who also
suffered early childhood abuse are incapable of minimal standards of
reasoning, these children will have to be morally responsible for their
actions. Nagel does not believe this to be the case, as he suggests that we
have to deal with moral luck since we nevertheless assess
blameworthiness based on the actor's effects, although "a substantial part
of the reasons for and outcome of all that one seeks to accomplish is
influenced by factors beyond one's control".40 Margaret Urban Walker
also reinforces this view by pointing out that 'moral luck is part of a
picture of impure agency: agency situated within the causal order in such
ways as to be variably conditioned by and conditioning parts of that
order, without being able to draw for all purposes a unitary boundary to
its exercise at either end, nor always for particular purposes a sharp
, 41
one .
However, I believe that the analysis made by both Nagel and
Walker fail to take into account two different aspects of responsibility.
As Gary Watson argues, we should distinguish between 'virtue
responsibility' which is what he calls the aretaic face of responsibility,
and 'capacity responsibility' which is what he calls the accountability
37 ibid 7.
38 M. U. Walker, 'Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency', in D. Statman (ed),
Moral Luck (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1993) 243.
39 B. Williams, 'Moral Luck: A Postscript', in Making Sense of Humanity and other
Philosophical Papers, 1982-1993, (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 241.
40 T. Nagel, 'Moral Luck', in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979)
36.
41 Walker (n 38) 243.
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face of responsibility.4 2 In deciding whether one is morally responsible in
the first place, I believe that we only need to address the issue of capacity
responsibility, since it is our ability to use reason to guide our actions
which allows us to even hold people accountable for what they do or fail
to do. What Nagel and Walker are in fact arguing is that we should
decide on whether a person is morally responsible based on the idea of
virtue responsibility. They suggest that we have to take into account how
it is that the environment will inevitably affect the actions of certain
people, in order to determine moral responsibility. I believe that this
should only matter when we wish to decide the extent of moral
responsibility a person should be ascribed, and this is only after we have
decided that that person can be morally responsible in the first place.43
Therefore, moral luck does not pose a threat to the concept of moral
responsibility, although it can prove to be a justification for why some
people are more responsible than others.
D. NEUROSCIENTIFIC CHALLENGES TO MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS
Now that I have addressed some of the challenges neuroscience poses to
the concept of moral responsibility, we can appreciate that causal
explanations cannot exist as an excuse for moral responsibility. In this
section of the essay, I will focus on how neuroscience as a causal
explanation for behaviour, can provide evidence of the presence of a
genuine excusing condition for moral responsibility in certain individuals
based on Kantian principles.44 I will explore the theoretical limits of the
extent to which such causal evidence can show a priori whether an
individual can be morally responsible for his or her actions before the
alleged immoral behaviour is exhibited. This will be done through two
possible defences of impaired cognitive ability and impaired volitional
ability which are raised by neuroscience. After setting out the theoretical
limits, I will proceed to suggest how neuroscience should fit into the
42 G. Watson, 'Two Faces of Responsibility' in Agency and Answerability (Oxford,
UK, 2004) 260-88.
43 N. A. Vincent, 'Madness, Badness and Neuroimaging-Based Responsibility
Assessments', in Freeman (n 1) 92-93.
44 Morse (n 1) 537.
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existing framework of behavioural evidence in assessing responsibility
where a priori assessment of moral responsibility cannot be done.
1. A Defence of Impaired Cognitive Ability
A defence against being morally responsible for one's actions based on
lack of cognitive ability is not alien to us. However, what we mean
when we say 'cognitive ability' is less clear. Employing a Kantian
conception of moral responsibility and freedom allows us to understand
that a lack of cognitive ability essentially means the impaired ability to
utilise pure practical reason. I believe that there are in fact two separate
categories of reasoning which we need to consider. The first category is
with regards to beings whose wills are not guided by imperatives. Even
hypothetical imperatives do not command them, because action is
arbitrary. The automatism case of Ken Parks illustrates this clearly. Parks
drove twenty-three kilometres to Ontario, where he stabbed both his
parents-in-law. He then drove to the police station and told the police
that he thought he had killed someone.4 6 As reported, only then did Parks
notice that his hands were badly injured. Parks was acquitted at trial, and
the Canadian Supreme Court on appeal held that Parks committed the act
in a state of automatism and was not responsible for his actions. 47
Therefore, where action cannot be governed by imperatives, an individual
cannot be held morally responsible, and we can make this assessment
before any behaviour is exhibited. This is, of course, subject to
normative valuations of how much lack of consciousness is deemed to
mean that the individual is subject to automatism, which cannot be
determined by neuroscience.
The second category is with regards to beings whose wills are
guided by imperatives, but cannot comprehend categorical imperatives.
Therefore, these beings are capable of acting with ends in mind, but their
diminished capacity to reason results in them not being able to
comprehend the universal moral law which is independent of ends. As
mentioned earlier, common examples of such beings are mentally
45 Roper v Simmons, 543 US. 551 (2005).
46 R. Broughton, R. Billings, R. Cartwright et al., 'Homicidal somnambulism: a case
report', (1994) Sleep 17: 254-64.
47 N. Levy and T. Bayne, 'Doing without deliberation: automatism, automaticity, and
moral accountability' (2004) International Review ofPsychiatry 16: 209-15.
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disabled or insane people. Therefore, as long as neuroscientific evidence
can show the lack of capacity for pure practical reason, we know a priori
that a being cannot be morally responsible for its actions. However, it
might not always be the case that neuroscience will provide definitive
evidence of a causal connection between imaging data showing brain
dysfunction and the incapacity to respond to moral reasons against certain
48
actions. Such a difficulty might be resolved as brain science develops,
and we will not consider this to be an issue at present.
Currently, there are other challenges to why neuroscience might
not be able to show this lack of capacity for reason. An example of this
would be the case of psychopaths. Neuroscientific studies have shown
that psychopaths suffer from amygdala dysfunction.49 The amygdala is a
central part of the emotional brain and affects our ability to recognise sad
and fearful expressions in other people, and also to differentiate between
types of wrong-doing. There are two such categories of wrongs -
conventional transgressions and moral transgressions.o Conventional
transgressions are wrongs which are based on the existence of authority
or rule. Moral transgressions are based on the wrongful nature of the act
in itself. Psychopaths have been shown to be unable to reliably
distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions. When
psychopaths were asked why something was wrong, the only
explanations given were because the rules said so, as opposed to reasons
citing the harmful nature of the act on others.5 ' Adopting a Kantian
analysis, psychopaths cannot understand the binding nature of the moral
law on their actions, because although they know that they are bound by
laws, these laws to them are not categorical imperatives, but merely
hypothetical. This is an important distinction to make, because one does
not doubt the ability of psychopaths to appreciate the action-guiding
nature of reason which makes them will an end. In fact, this is often the
very reason why many people regard psychopaths 'as bad, not mad'.52
48 W. Glannon, 'What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal
Responsibility', in Freeman (n 1) 27.
49 J. Blair, D. Mitchell, and K. Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain
(Blackwell, 2005).
50 E. Turiel, The development of social knowledge: morality and convention,
(Cambridge University Press, 1977).
s1 Levy (n 29) 249.
52 ibid. 248.
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However, the limits of brain science in excusing psychopaths from
responsibility were tested by psychologist Robert Hare. In the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist, Hare argues that psychopathy is an aggravating
rather than a mitigating factor. 53 It is not clear whether abnormalities in
the brain of psychopaths caused the behaviour, or whether the brain
54
abnormality was a result of behaviour over time. This is another area
which neuroscience will have to address if it is to work as evidence of a
lack of capacity to reason.
2. A Defence of Impaired Volition
Individuals might also seek to use neuroscientific evidence to disclaim
moral responsibility by arguing that they have an impaired ability to
control their behaviour. An example of this would be the ability to
control violent impulses. Neuroscience has produced findings through
imaging of the brain, which show that many impulsive murderers have
reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex and increased activity in the
amygdala . These images suggest that these murderers had significantly
impaired impulse control. A preliminary point to note is that individuals
who employ this line of argument do not propose that they are incapable
of understanding the moral law which obligates them. Therefore, when
committing immoral acts, these people are fully aware that they are not
acting from duty to uphold the moral law.
I will argue that when neuroscientific evidence can show the total
lack of capacity to inhibit impulse, it can serve as a priori evidence for
excusing moral responsibility through establishing a strong causal
connection between the relevant brain dysfunction and loss of control.
Kantian moral philosophy is premised on the notion that we are both
beings in the phenomenal world where we are subjected to the laws of
nature, and in the noumenal world where we are autonomous beings
subjected to the universal moral law.56 An individual who lacks the
53 R. Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist (2nd ed, Multi-Health Systems, 2003).
54 Glannon, 'What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal
Responsibility' (n 48), 22-23.
ss R. J. Davidson, K. M. Putnam, and C.L. Larson, 'Dysfunction in the Neural
Circuitry of Emotion Regulation - A possible Prelude to Violence' (2000) 289
Science 591-594.
56 Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics ofMorals (n 4), 57/452.
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capacity to inhibit his impulses is one who is governed solely by the laws
of nature, because he is unable to affect his actions through his will
governed by the moral law. Therefore, we can conclude that such
individuals should not be held morally responsible for their actions, as
they are merely agents of external causes, rather than legislators of the
first causes in the world.57 The famous case of an American teacher in
Virginia who started displaying paedophilic tendencies due to a
meningioma pressing on his orbitofrontal cortex is a clear example of
this. The teacher after making advances to his 12 year-old stepdaughter,
was removed from his home and ordered to complete a 12-step residential
problem for sexual addiction or he would go to prison. Although he was
strongly motivated to not go to prison, the teacher solicited sex from
clients and staff of the program and was expelled from it. Before his
sentencing, the tumour in his brain was discovered and removed, which
resolved the paedophilia. However, this paedophilia returned with the
growth of a new tumour in the same brain region, only to go away again
after a second removal.5 8 This was a case where neuroscientific evidence
could show a strong causal connection between the existence of the
tumour and the behaviour of the teacher. The teacher would rightly not
be morally responsible for any subsequent paedophilic tendencies
exhibited, so long as neuroscientific evidence could prove the same
causal connection. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that the loss of
capacity to inhibit impulse proved by neuroscience can serve as an a
priori excusing condition for moral responsibility.
Now that I have established this possibility, I will discuss a case of
how neuroscience is a priori unable to provide proof of an excusing
condition for moral responsibility. One such case would be people
suffering from Tourette Syndrome (TS). TS is characterised by frequent
physical tics and at least one vocal tic. 59 10% of people suffering from
TS have a vocal tic called coprolalia, which makes them use crude and
5 C. M. Korsgaard, 'Morality as freedom' in Creating the Kingdom of Ends
(Cambridge University Press 2000) 163.
58 H. T. Greely, 'Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility: Proving 'Can't Help
Himself as a Narrow Bar to Criminal Liability' in Freeman (n 1) 71-73.
59 J. F. Leckman, R. A. King, D. J. Cohen, 'Tics and tic disorders' in J. F. Leckman
and D. J. Cohen, eds., Tourette's Syndrome - Tics, Obsessions, Compulsions. (John
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1999) 23-41.
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obscene language for no reason. We get a clear sense of the extent to
which TS sufferers attempt to control their impulses from various studies.
One study showed that a TS sufferer would bang his head against
surfaces, push his fingers up his nose till blood gushed out and hit his
own face, to the extent that he sometimes broke his nose. 6 0 Other reports
show that sufferers of TS would resign from their jobs, and relocate their
lives in order to remove themselves from situations which cause them to
feel the impulse to act in a way which they know is harmful to themselves
and to others. 6 1 However, neuroscientific evidence can only show that TS
sufferers have some capacity to inhibit impulses but find it difficult to do
so. Since Kant recognises that human beings are contingently rational,
we know that imperatives command our will in the form of a law. TS is
an example of the extent of the practical limits to which reason can
govern our actions. However, as long as there is a capacity to inhibit
one's impulses, no matter how difficult it may be, one can be morally
responsible when reason succumbs to inclination. Also, just because
neuroscientific evidence shows a diminished capacity to inhibit impulse
does not give anyone a blanket excusing factor for all kinds of wrong-
doing. To draw an analogy from cases of coercion and acting under
duress, we still find people morally responsible for their actions, even
though the extent of responsibility is mitigated (sometimes to the point of
non-existence) depending on the circumstances. 62  In such instances
where neuroscience cannot show a total loss of capacity to inhibit
impulse, behavioural evidence will be needed as well, in order to provide
an excusing or mitigating condition for moral responsibility.
3. How Neuroscientific Evidence can Help Inform Us of Moral
Responsibility regarding Certain Individuals
In cases where neuroscience can establish the lack of consciousness when
acting, incapability to utilise pure practical reason, or when there is a total
loss of impulse inhibition, we can conclude that individuals suffering
from these problems cannot be morally responsible for their actions a
priori of any behavioural evidence. However, when neuroscience can
60 ibid.
61 ibid.
62 Levy (n 29) 252.
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only show these various conditions to a certain degree, I will argue that
neuroscience can help to establish the presence of an excusing or
mitigating condition for immoral action, but only when supported by
behavioural evidence.
As mentioned earlier, the automatism defence is subject to the
normative judgment of how much consciousness a person must have to
be deemed as a subject of automatism. However, once this line is
established, it is theoretically impossible to set out a sliding scale of
automatism. Either a being is capable of being governed by imperatives,
or his actions are arbitrary. There is no in between. Behavioural
evidence is not a factor in this defence, since we only seek to establish
that a person was a subject of automatism, and whatever actions
committed as a result is inconsequential.
For cases of incapacity to reason, assuming that there is evidence
showing that brain dysfunction caused the lack of capacity to reason, I
believe that moral responsibility can be mitigated. Since we are
contingently rational beings who are bound by both laws of nature and
the moral law, our capacity for reason comes in degrees along a
spectrum. 6 3 If an individual is impaired in his capacity to reason, he or
she will be less able to affect his actions in the world through obeying the
moral law. Therefore, the primary means of assessing a person's
culpability will have to be done from evidence of the behaviour of that
person. An example of this is would be adolescent criminals, who are
deemed to have a lesser capacity for reason than adults. 64 Presumably,
this lower capacity for reason does not meet the criteria established to
show total inability for pure practical reason. However, in order for the
extent of mitigation to be decided upon, we have to first identify the
behaviour of the adolescent, and match the seriousness of his or her
immoral acts with the lack of capacity for reason. An example would be
an adolescent who committed murder. The first thing we should do is to
assess his actions, and make a judgment as to whether a lower capacity
for reason would necessarily mean that the adolescent did not know the
gravity of his actions. The neuroscientific evidence will only serve to
63 W. Glannon, Bioethics and the Brain (Oxford University Press 2007) 57.
64 Roper v Simmons, 543 US. 551 (2005).
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reinforce our judgment, if we so decide that the adolescent was of an age
which meant that he did not comprehend how immoral his act was.65
Regarding volitional defences, evidence showing anything less
than a total loss of control to inhibit impulses cannot act as an excusing
condition. The degree of moral responsibility to be ascribed, however, is
another matter altogether. Using the example of TS sufferers, we can see
that some of the sufferers go to great lengths to control their impulses.
Such behavioural evidence will allow us an insight into the circumstances
of how diminished control over a particular impulse afflicts TS sufferers.
Neuroscientific evidence showing that TS sufferers have some capacity to
inhibit impulses but find it difficult to do so coupled with behavioural
evidence can form a basis for mitigating the moral responsibility of
people suffering from TS.
E. NEUROSCIENCE AND LEGAL DOCTRINES
As far as our understanding of moral responsibility allows us to ascribe a
degree of culpability on individuals, it cannot serve as the only basis for
66justice. Kant made this point in his jurisprudential writings, when he
separated the offices of law and morality. 67 However, our legal system is
undoubtedly informed by Kantian moral philosophy and moral
responsibility. One such aspect is the law's concept of a person. A legal
person is one who is capable of acting intentionally and for reasons. The
law treats all people as practical reasoners, and simply assumes that all
human beings unless proven otherwise are capable of acting for reasons
and have rationality according to mostly conventional, socially
constructed standards. 6 8 Therefore, the idea of legal responsibility is only
possible if we treat human beings as capable of using reasons derived
from moral and legal rules as potential guides to acting.69 This is what
Stephen Morse calls the 'folk psychological' view of the person and
65 N. A. Vincent, 'Responsibility: distinguishing virtue from capacity' (2009) 3 Polish
Journal ofPhilosophy 115.
66 S. K. Houser, 'Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus' (1993) 54 Ohio St. L. J
1139.
67 Blumoff (n 34) 185.
68 S. Morse, 'New Neuroscience, Old Problems: Legal Implications of Brain Science'
in Glannon (n 3) 197.
69 ibid.
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behaviour.70 That said, most legal systems do not just serve the purpose
of retribution for moral wrongdoing. The law also seeks to guide action,
by informing people of what is undesirable conduct so that they can plan
their lives. The law also serves the purpose for specific deterrence of
future bad actions by any one defendant and general deterrence of bad
actions by others in the population. In the area of criminal law, ascribing
legal responsibility strives to prevent future crimes by incapacitating
convicted criminals, and even rehabilitation.' With these thoughts in
mind, I will discuss three potential contributions neuroscience can make
to the doctrine of legal responsibility.
1. Altering or Abandoning Certain Folk Psychologies
Neuroscience can help demonstrate that certain folk psychological criteria
underlying a particular legal doctrine is wrong, and thus suggest how that
doctrine should be changed or abandoned. However, neuroscientific
evidence proving this must show specifically how the data obtained
confirms or challenges the underlying folk psychological assumptions. It
is not enough to just show whether the brain plays a causal role in action,
since as stated earlier, causation is never an excuse for responsibility on
its own. For example, neuroscience may also teach us about cognitive
processing under stress which could conceivably influence our doctrines
72
on informed consent. Also, neuroscience might help to show that
'excited utterances' as an exception to the hearsay rule in criminal
evidence might be misguided, if brain imaging can demonstrate that
excitement might decrease accuracy of recalling past memories. 73
However, one has to keep in mind that any such scientific data which
seeks to reform our evidential practices will have to be backed by valid
data which are genuinely relevant to the particular doctrine, and also
show that changes made to established practices will be beneficial.7 4
70 Morse (n 1) 529.
71 Greely (n 58) 61.
72 Morse "New Neuroscience, Old Problems: Legal Implications of Brain Science" (n
68) 203.
73 Morse (n 1) 541.
74 Morse (n 68) 202.
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2. Possibilities of New Legal Doctrines
Secondly, neuroscience can help us to bring about change in legal
doctrine or practices. In cases where it is found that there is a lack of
consciousness when acting, incapability to utilise pure practical reason, or
when there is a total loss of impulse inhibition through neuroscientific
evidence, it would be pointless to apply certain legal doctrines. An
example of this would be in the case of automatism. Since a person
suffering from automatism does not have any idea of what he or she is
doing, it would be pointless for the prosecution to attempt to establish the
mens rea of the crime. This is not to say that such individuals should not
be prosecuted, since the criminal law also serves purposes of
rehabilitation and protection of society against certain harmful
individuals. It would just mean that it might be appropriate for the law to
establish new criteria for conviction when individuals of the above
mentioned situations are involved. Also, neuroscientific evidence can
help to confirm that some categories of defendants have a much greater
difficulty obeying the law in cases of provocation and temptation. In the
interest of justice, it might therefore be justifiable for the criminal law to
adopt a generic partial mitigating doctrine, rather than to leave it to the
discretion of the judge during sentencing.
3. Implementation of Sentencing Policies
Our current law of criminal sentencing, and civil judgments with
elements of specific performance or commitment, are based on
predictions of future behaviour of the parties. Neuroscience can help to
reinforce or improve the criteria for such judgments. This is probably the
most straightforward case for application, since rather than focusing on
analysing the specific mental states of individuals, it is the neuroscientific
studies of certain groups of people which will be utilised.76 Neuroscience
can improve predictions of how certain groups of individuals will benefit
from treatment programs or suspended sentences. It can also provide
valuable information as to the prophylactic or rehabilitative use of various
sentencing measures for people with neurological problems, such as
75 S. Morse (n 1) 541- 542.
76 ibid, 542.
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children with low-MAOA activity who also suffered early childhood
abuse. 77
Although academics such as Searle have warned us that we need to
incorporate scientific research into current normative frameworks for
legal responsibility in order to prevent our legal model from being
outmoded, 8 we have to be cautious in falling prey to what Morse calls
'brain overclaim syndrome'.79 The ruling by the United States Supreme
Court in Roper v Simmons8 0 underscores this very point, where the court
was astute in not being overwhelmed by the imaging studies of
adolescent brains presented to them by the amicus curiae brief. Instead,
the majority opinion was based on developmental psychology and
common sense observation that adolescents are on average less rational
than adults.8 Such an approach would allow for the law to develop in an
organic and sensible manner, by taking into account developments in
science while not being overzealous in concluding that our current legal
presumptions are erroneous.
F. CONCLUSION
This essay has discussed how neuroscience should affect our concept of
moral responsibility derived from Kantian moral philosophy. In the
absence of any resolution of the metaphysical problem of free will,
neuroscience does not pose a threat to the existence of moral
responsibility. However, with respect to certain cases, neuroscience can
inform us that certain individuals cannot be morally responsible for their
actions. Also, certain legal doctrines and practices can benefit from the
advancements in neuroscience, and should be encouraged. To put things
in perspective, the current extent of neuroscientific development does
have its limitations. We have to recognise that a person's behaviour is
influenced by a multitude of factors, such as genetic, endocrinological,
social and economic among others, and that it will be difficult in most
7 ibid, 535.
78 j. Searle, Mind, (Oxford University Press 2004) 209.
79 S. Morse 'Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic
Note' (2006) 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 397.
80 Roper v Simmons, 543 US. 551 (2005).
81 Glannon, 'What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal
Responsibility' (n 48) 28.
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instances to say that a brain image will be able to show culpability or
nonculpability. 82 As long as we adopt neuroscience within our current
normative frameworks of free will and responsibility, the rapid
advancement in our understanding of the mechanistic functions of our
brain and its relationship with the mind, will allow us to work out exactly
when we can hold someone responsible for his or her actions.
82 D. Mobbs, H. C. Lau, 0. D. Jones, and C. D. Frith, 'Law, Responsibility and the
Brain', in M. Freeman and 0. R. Goodenough (n 78), 20. See also, M. Gazzaniga,
The Ethical Brain (Dana Press, 2005) 100.
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